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We construct a two-country DSGE model with multiple stages of processing and local-
currency staggered price-setting to study cross-country quantity correlations driven by mon-
etary shocks. The model embodies a mechanism that propagates a monetary surprise in the
home country to lower the foreign price level while restraining the home price level from rising
too quickly. It does so through reducing material costs in terms of the foreign currency unit
while dampening the upward movements in the costs in terms of the home currency unit, both
in absolute terms and relative to the costs of primary factors. We show that, through this
mechanism and a resulting factor substitution e®ect, the model is able to generate signi¯cant
cross-country quantity correlations, with correlations in consumption considerably lower than
correlations in output, as in the data.
JEL classi¯cation: E32, F31, F41
Key Words: Production chain; Vertical international trade; International comovement
21 Introduction
A central challenge to models of international business cycles is to explain the observed patterns
in cross-country quantity correlations. While the data typically reveal signi¯cant cross-country
correlations in consumption and in output, with the former considerably lower than the latter,
standard models typically fail to predict these patterns. A one-sector international real business
cycle model, for instance, usually generates low or negative international correlations in output
and near-perfect correlations in consumption [e.g., Baxter (1995) and Backus, Kehoe and
Kydland (1992, 1995)]. Incorporating multiple sectors into this class of models helps raise
output correlations to be positive, but consumption correlations remain too high [e.g., Ambler,
Cardia, and Zimmermann (2002), and Kouparitsas (forthcoming)]. The standard international
monetary business cycle models do not fair better: models with sellers' local currency pricing
tend to generate large and positive correlations in consumption and small or even negative
correlations in output [see the survey in Lane (2001)], while models with buyers' local currency
pricing mostly predict near-zero correlations in both output and consumption, unless shocks
are assumed to be highly correlated across countries [e.g., Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2002)]. This mismatch between the models' predictions and the data is often referred to as
the \quantity anomaly" in the international business cycle literature.
In this paper, we propose a mechanism that may help resolve the quantity anomaly. Our
model incorporates the observation that production of consumption goods in the modern world
economy typically involves multiple stages of processing and multiple border-crossing of in-
termediate goods.1 In the model, we consider monetary shocks as a driving force of the
international quantity correlations, and we stress the role of multiple stages of processing and
trade in propagating the shocks via local currency pricing and staggered price contracts.2 We
1For empirical evidence on the vertical patterns of production and trade, see, for example, Hummels, et al.
(1998), Hummels, et al. (2001), and Yi (2003). Yi (2003) shows that the multiple \border-crossing" of a same
set of goods may be a key for unlocking the mysteries of the large rise in world trade over the past decades and
the non-linear pattern in this rise.
2Empirical evidence on local currency pricing behaviors has been documented at least since Page (1981),
and a review of this literature can be found in Goldberg and Knetter (1997), among others. For empirical
evidence on staggered price contracts, see the survey by Taylor (1999). There is a large body of work that
aims at rationalizing the behaviors of local currency pricing and staggered price setting, which are now two
standard assumptions adopted by the literature in explaining the observed large and persistent movements in
the relative prices of traded goods. This strand of literature shows that the failure of the law of one price
among traded goods accounts for a major proportion of the observed real exchange rate °uctuations. See, Engel
(1993, 1999), Knetter (1993), Gagnon and Knetter (1995), and Engel and Rogers (1996), among many others.
3choose to focus on the role of monetary shocks and nominal rigidities because much empirical
evidence suggests a close connection between international monetary regimes and the behaviors
of real exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables [e.g., Basu and Taylor (1999), and
Kiley (1999)].3 We do not assume a large cross-country correlation in the shocks, because such
an assumption does not seem to be supported by empirical evidence, and, after all, it does not
help to get the cross-country correlations in consumption and in output into the right order.
The model embodies a mechanism that propagates a monetary surprise in the home country
to lower the foreign price level while restraining the home price level from rising too quickly.
It does so through reducing material costs and thus marginal costs in terms of the foreign
currency unit, while dampening the upward movements in these costs in terms of the home
currency unit. In consequence, it tends to amplify and align the movements in the two coun-
tries' real aggregate demands and real purchasing powers and to attenuate the terms-of-trade
e®ect, which would otherwise bene¯t home households and ¯rms at the cost of their foreign
counterparts. These all help increase the cross-country quantity correlations. Further, the
reduction in the costs of materials relative to the costs of primary factors creates an incen-
tive for ¯rms to substitute intermediate inputs for primary factors. The possibility of factor
substitution e®ectively constrains the tendency of international comovement in labor hours,
and with nonseparable preferences in consumption and leisure, the cross-country correlation in
consumption as well. Through this mechanism, the model with multiple stages of processing
and trade not only helps increase the international quantity correlations, it helps increase the
output correlation more than it helps increase the consumption correlation, putting the two
quantity correlations into the right order.
The mechanism that we propose sheds light on some observed features of international
quantity correlations. For instance, the output correlations between the United States and
Rogo® (1996), Devereux (1997), and Betts and Devereux (2000) provide useful surveys of this literature, while
Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000), Chang and Devereux (1998), Devereux and Engel (1998), Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2000), Bergin and Feenstra (2001), and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) develop general
equilibrium models of this type.
3Recent years have witnessed a burgeoning interest in developing a new workhorse for open-economy macroe-
conomics in which monetary shocks are the source of international business cycle °uctuations. Devereux (1997)
and Lane (2001) provide useful surveys of this \new open-economy macroeconomics" literature. For a more
recent paper that features monetary shocks as a driving force of international business cycle dynamics, see
Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (forthcoming). The recent work by Kehoe and Perri (2002) emphasizes the role
of incomplete asset markets in helping establish a correct order between cross-country consumption correlation
and output correlation.
4other OECD countries are considerably larger than the consumption correlations, and this
pattern also holds between the OECD countries in general (see Table 1). The predicted quan-
tity correlations in our model with four stages of processing are broadly consistent with this
observation (see Table 10). As we argue in the Calibration section, a number of four stages
seems to be an empirically plausible estimate for the production structure in a typical industri-
alized country such as the United States, since these countries tend to produce and trade with
each other a broad range of commodities, from agriculture and mining to manufacturing and
services. By contrast, less developed countries, such as the emerging market economies, tend to
produce and trade with each other mostly raw materials and simple primary goods.4 We argue
that a smaller number of processing stages does not seem to be an empirically objectionable
estimate for the production of a typical good in these economies. Incidentally, the quantity
correlations across the Latin American countries, though also typically higher in output than
in consumption, are signi¯cantly weaker than those across the OECD countries (see Table 2).
Evidently, the predictions of our model with two processing stages are suggestive of the quan-
tity correlations observed between the Latin American economies (see Table 10). In this sense,
our model sheds some light on why the quantity correlations between the OECD countries are
systematically greater than those within the Latin America region, while within each region
the consumption correlations are considerably smaller than the output correlations.
Our work is closely related to several recent contributions. Betts and Devereux (2000)
construct a model with buyers' local currency pricing and pre-set prices to address the issue
of exchange rate persistence and cross-country quantity co-movements. They emphasize the
role of government spending shocks in accounting for the observed order between cross-country
output correlation and cross-country consumption correlation. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2002) present a model with local currency pricing and staggered price-setting, which is similar
to the degenerate case of ours with a single stage of processing. They assume a large cross-
country correlation in monetary shocks and they aim at generating exchange rate volatility
and persistence. Bergin and Feenstra (2001) consider a roundabout input-output structure in
conjunction with translog preferences to investigate exchange rate behavior.
4According to the OECD (1994), 55 percent of world trade in 1991 occurred between the OECD countries, 82
percent of which was trade in manufactured goods. In contrast, according to the World Development Indicators,
about 80 percent of the trade between countries in the Latin America region is accounted for by trade in primary
goods.
5In what follows, Section 2 sets up the model with multiple stages of processing and trade,
Section 3 provides some intuitions to help gain insights into the shock propagation mechanism
embodied in the model, Section 4 presents numerical simulations and discusses the model's
quantitative implications, and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix presents some analytical
results to formally demonstrate the mechanism.
2 A Two-Country Model with Multiple Stages of Processing
The world economy consists of a home country and a foreign country. Each country is popu-
lated by a large number of identical, in¯nitely lived households, each consuming an aggregate
consumption good and supplying labor and capital to domestic ¯rms. The production of ¯nal
consumption or investment goods in each country requires N ¸ 1 stages of processing, from
raw materials to intermediate goods, and then to more advanced intermediate goods, and so
on. At each stage, there is a continuum of domestic ¯rms producing di®erentiated products
indexed in the interval [0;1], with an elasticity of substitution µ > 1. The production of each
type of intermediate goods at stage n 2 f2;:::;Ng uses all types of intermediate goods pro-
duced at stage n ¡ 1, either domestically produced or imported, along with labor and capital
supplied by domestic households. The production of goods at the ¯rst stage uses domestic
primary factors only.
At each date t, the world economy experiences a realization of shocks st. The history of
events up to t is denoted by st ´ (s0;¢¢¢;st), with probability ¼(st). The initial realization s0
is given.










where ¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount factor, C(st) and M(st) denote consumption and
money balances, respectively, L(st) is labor hours, and ¹ PN(st) denotes the home price level.





· W(st)L(st) + R(st)K(st¡1) + ¦(st) + B(st) + M(st¡1) + T(st) (1)
for all t and all st, where B(st+1) is a one-period nominal bond that costs D(st+1jst) units of
home currency at st and pays o® one unit of home currency at t + 1 if st+1 is realized, W(st)
6is the nominal wage rate, R(st) is the capital rental rate, K(st¡1) is the beginning-of-period
capital stock, ¦(st) is the household's claim to ¯rms' pro¯ts, and T(st) is a nominal lump-sum
transfer from the home government. The term YN(st) in the budget constraint is the purchase
of ¯nal goods to be used for consumption or investment. In particular, it is given by




where K(st) denotes the end-of-period capital stock, ± 2 (0;1) is the depreciation rate of
capital, and Ã > 0 is a capital adjustment cost parameter.
The ¯nal goods are an aggregate composite of domestic and imported ¯nished goods (i.e.,
produced at stage N), with the aggregation technology given by
YN(st) = ¹ YNH(st)° ¹ YNF(st)1¡°; (3)












µ¡1 is a composite of goods imported from the foreign country, both produced
at stage N. The parameter µ determines the steady state markup of price over marginal cost,
and the parameter ° measures the share of expenditures on domestically produced goods in
total expenditures on all goods.
The household maximizes utility subject to (1)-(3) and a borrowing constraint B(st) ¸ ¡ ¹ B,
for some large positive number ¹ B, for each st and each t ¸ 0, with initial conditions K(s¡1),
M(s¡1), and B(s0) given. The resulting demand functions for a type i ¯nished good produced























1¡µ is the price index of ¯nished goods produced and




1¡µ is the price index of ¯nished
goods imported from the foreign country. The overall price level in the home country is an
average of the two price indices, that is,
¹ PN(st) = ¹ ° ¹ PNH(st)° ¹ PNF(st)1¡°; (6)
where ¹ ° = °¡°(1 ¡ °)°¡1.
7A de¯ning feature of the model is that the production of ¯nished goods in each country
involves multiple stages of processing and multiple boarder-crossing of intermediate goods.
The production of a stage-1 good of type i 2 [0;1] in the home country requires home primary
factors as inputs, with a standard Cobb-Douglas production function given by
Y1H(i;st) + Y ¤
1H(i;st) = K1(i;st)®L1(i;st)1¡®; (7)
where K1 and L1 are home capital and labor inputs, and the parameter ® 2 (0;1) measures
the cost share of capital. The output is either sold in the home country (Y1H(i)) or exported
(Y ¤
1H(i)) to the foreign country.
To produce a stage-n good of type i 2 [0;1], for n 2 f2;:::;Ng, requires not only home pri-
mary factors but a composite of stage-(n¡1) goods, both domestically produced and imported.
The production function is a constant-return-to-scale technology given by
YnH(i;st) + Y ¤
nH(i;st) = ¹ Yn(i;st)Á[Kn(i;st)®Ln(i;st)1¡®]1¡Á; (8)
where Kn and Ln are home capital and labor inputs, and ¹ Yn = ¹ Yn¡1;H(st)° ¹ Yn¡1;F(st)1¡°













µ¡1, imported from foreign
suppliers.
Firms at each processing stage are price-takers in their input markets and monopolistic
competitors in their output markets, where they set prices in the buyers' local currency (e.g.,
Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000) and Chari, et al. (2002)), with pricing decisions staggered
between ¯rms within each processing stage (e.g., Taylor (1980)). More speci¯cally, at each
date, and on each stage of processing and trade, half of the home producers cannot adjust
their prices, while the other half can each choose a pair of new prices: PnH(i;st) in the home
currency unit for its product to be sold in the home market and P¤
nH(i;st) in the foreign
currency unit for its product to be exported to the foreign market. Once a new price is set, it
will remain in e®ect for two periods.5
5We set the duration of price contracts to two periods so as to minimize the amount of exogenous staggering in
price-setting. In this sense, the model's equilibrium dynamics are mostly driven by the endogenous propagation
mechanism embodied in the production and trading chain rather than by the exogenous nominal staggering per
se.
8At each date t, upon the realization of st, a home ¯rm i 2 [0;1] at stage n 2 f1;:::;Ng






D(s¿jst)f[PnH(i;st) ¡ Vn(i;s¿)]Y d
nH(i;s¿) + [e(s¿)P¤
nH(i;st) ¡ Vn(i;s¿)]Y ¤d
nH(i;s¿)g; (9)
taking as given the unit cost function Vn(i;s¿), the output demand schedules Y d
nH(i;s¿) and
Y ¤d
nH(i;s¿), and the nominal exchange rate e(st), measured by units of domestic currency per
unit of foreign currency.
The unit cost function V1 for a ¯rm at stage 1 can be derived from minimizing the cost
WL1 + RK1 subject to the production function (7). In particular, V1 is given by
V1(st) ´ V1(i;st) = ¹ ®R(st)®W(st)1¡®; (10)






to (8). The resulting unit cost function is given by
Vn(st) ´ Vn(i;st) = ¹ Á ¹ Pn¡1(st)ÁV1(st)1¡Á; (11)
where ¹ Á = Á¡Á(1 ¡ Á)¡(1¡Á), and ¹ Pn¡1(st) is the price index for all goods produced by home
and foreign ¯rms at stage n ¡ 1 and used by i at stage n as inputs. In particular, the price
index of all stage-n goods is given by
¹ Pn(st) = ¹ ° ¹ PnH(st)° ¹ PnF(st)1¡°; (12)








1¡µ are the price indices of
stage-n home goods and of stage-n imported goods, respectively.































for n 2 f1;¢¢¢;N ¡ 1g, where ~ Yn+1 ´
R 1
0 [Yn+1;H(j) + Y ¤
n+1;H(j)]dj is a linear aggregate of
all goods produced at stage n + 1 in the home country. We can similarly derive the demand
schedules Y ¤d
nH(i;st) and Y ¤d
nF(i;st) for the foreign country. Equation (13) says that the demand
for a type i good produced at stage n in either country is higher if its price relative to the
9price index of all such goods is lower, if the price index of these goods relative to the overall
price index of stage-n goods is lower, or if the cost of materials relative to the cost of primary
factors is lower.
With the unit cost functions and output demand schedules derived from the embedded






























where n 2 f1;:::;Ng. The price-setting rule in (15) says that the optimal price set for the
home market in home currency unit is a constant markup over a weighted average of the ¯rm's
marginal costs within the duration of its price contract, where the weights are the normalized
quantity of demand for its output in the corresponding periods. The price-setting rule in (16)
can be interpreted similarly, where the currency units are appropriately converted using the
nominal exchange rate.
The problems facing the households and ¯rms in the foreign country are analogous.
We now specify monetary policy processes. There is a monetary authority in each country.
Newly created money by the monetary authority in one country is injected into the domestic
economy via a lump-sum transfer to domestic households so that T(st) = M(st) ¡ M(st¡1)
and T¤(st) = M¤(st) ¡ M¤(st¡1). The money stocks in the two countries grow according to
M(st) = ¹(st)M(st¡1) and M¤(st) = ¹¤(st)M¤(st¡1), where the money growth rates ¹(st)
and ¹¤(st) follow stationary stochastic processes given by
ln¹(st) = ½¹ ln¹(st¡1) + "t; ln¹¤(st) = ½¹ ln¹¤(st¡1) + "¤
t; (17)
where ½¹ 2 (0;1), and "t and "¤
t are uncorrelated Gausian processes with zero mean and ¯nite
variance ¾2
¹.











n(i;st)di = L(st). The market clearing
conditions for the primary factors in the foreign country are similar. The world bond market
clearing condition requires that B(st) + B¤(st) = 0.
An equilibrium for this economy is a collection of allocations fC(st), K(st), L(st), M(st),
B(st+1)g for households in the home country; allocations fC¤(st), K¤(st), L¤(st), M¤(st),
B¤(st+1)g for households in the foreign country; allocations fYnH(i;st);Y ¤
nH(i;st);Kn(i;st);Ln(i;st))g
10and prices fPnH(i;st);P¤
nH(i;st)g for ¯rms in the home country, where i 2 [0;1] and n 2
f1;:::;Ng; allocations fYnF(i;st);Y ¤
nF(i;st);K¤
n(i;st);L¤
n(i;st)g and prices fPnF(i;st);P¤
nF(i;st)g
for ¯rms in the foreign country, where i 2 [0;1] and n 2 f1;:::;Ng; price indices f ¹ Pn(st); ¹ P¤
n(st)g,
for n 2 f1;:::;Ng; wages fW(st);W¤(st)g; capital rental rates fR(st);R¤(st)g; and bond
prices D(st+1jst); that satisfy the following four conditions: (i) taking wages, capital rental
rates, and prices as given, households' allocations solve their utility maximization problems;
(ii) taking wages, capital rental rates, and all prices but its own as given, each ¯rm's alloca-
tions and price solve its pro¯t-maximization problem; (iii) domestic capital, labor, and money
markets and world asset markets clear; (iv) monetary policies are as speci¯ed.
In what follows, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all ¯rms in the same price-
setting cohort at the same stage of production and trade in the same country make identical
pricing decisions. In such an equilibrium, ¯rms are identi¯ed by the country in which they
operate, the stage at which they produce and trade, and the time at which they can change
prices. Thus, from now on, we can drop the individual ¯rms' indices i and j, and denote, for
example, by PnH(t) the price set for the home market by a ¯rm that operates in the home
country, produces at stage n, and gets the chance to change its price at date t.
3 International Monetary Transmission: Some Intuitions
This section illustrates the basic intuitions behind the mechanism through which multiple
stages of processing help propagate monetary shocks across countries to generate the observed
patterns of international quantity correlations. The main idea is that a monetary expansion
in, say, the home country, through home currency depreciation, tends to generate a fall in the
foreign price level and a rise in the home price level when there are multiple stages of processing;
the fall is larger and the rise is smaller, the greater is the number of the processing stages. The
key to understanding how this mechanism works is understanding how, at a more advanced
processing stage, material costs and thus marginal costs facing ¯rms fall more in terms of
the foreign currency unit while rising less in terms of the home currency unit, and complete
adjustment of these variables takes a longer period of time. These patterns of marginal cost
adjustments imply that the fall in the foreign price level is magni¯ed and the rise in the home
price level is attenuated on a period-by-period basis and complete adjustment of the two price
levels requires a longer period of time.
11The attenuation, through multiple processing stages, in the upward movements of the
marginal costs in terms of the home currency unit, and thus in the home price level, following
a home monetary expansion may sound intuitive and less surprising to the reader who is familiar
with the closed-economy version of the model [e.g., Huang and Liu (2001)]. What is new in
this open-economy setup here is the fall in the marginal costs in terms of the foreign currency
unit, and thus in the foreign price level, and the magni¯cation of its magnitude through the
multiple processing stages following the home monetary expansion. Indeed, this is a unique
feature and the novelty of the present open-economy model. It is therefore worth spending
some e®ort to understand the intuitions behind this new feature.
We note ¯rst, as we show formally in the Appendix, that, under fairly general speci¯cations
of households' preferences, the assumption of competitive domestic factor and international
asset markets imply that a monetary expansion in the home country, while resulting in a full
rise in home factor prices immediately, leaves foreign factor prices unchanged and leads to a
complete home currency depreciation. Since stage-1 production requires only primary factors,
¯rms at this stage in the foreign country face unchanged marginal costs and so do ¯rms at this
stage in the home country once their marginal costs are converted into the foreign currency
unit using the spot nominal exchange rates. As a consequence, neither of these ¯rms has an
incentive to change its price set for the foreign market. If all production and trade occurred
at this single stage, the foreign price level would remain unchanged, and foreign aggregate
demand would also remain unchanged. This is why the degenerate version of the model with
a single processing stage fails as an international monetary transmission mechanism.
Consider next the case with two stages of processing. Stage-2 production requires not
only primary factors but also material inputs from stage 1. Firms at this second stage in the
foreign country still face untacked marginal costs, since their material suppliers do not change
prices. These ¯rms thus do not have incentives to change their prices set for the foreign market
either. Meanwhile, ¯rms at this second stage in the home country face only a partial rise in
their marginal costs on impact, since half of their material suppliers cannot yet change prices.
Because of the complete home currency depreciation, these marginal costs, once converted into
the foreign currency unit, fall partially in e®ect. Hence, these ¯rms, if they can set new prices,
would partially lower their prices set for the foreign market. The foreign price level therefore
declines partially both on impact and in the subsequent date owing to the two-period staggered
price contracts.
12Assume now there are three stages of processing. Firms at the third stage in the foreign
country face a partial fall in their marginal costs both on impact and in the subsequent date
owing to the fall in their material costs in these two periods. Thus, these ¯rms, when they
can set new prices, would partially lower their prices set for the foreign market. Further, the
marginal costs facing ¯rms at the third stage in the home country rise even less in terms of
the home currency unit and thus fall even more in terms of the foreign currency unit than
those at the second stage. In consequence, these ¯rms, when they can set new prices, would
lower their prices set for the foreign market by even more than would the home ¯rms at the
second stage. The foreign price level thus declines in not only the ¯rst two but also the third
periods following the home monetary expansion, and by more than in the case with two stages
of processing.
The patterns in foreign and home price dynamics at di®erent processing stages following
a home monetary expansion under empirically reasonable parameter values are illustrated in
Tables 3 and 4. These patterns of price dynamics are the key to understanding how multiple
stages of processing help propagate monetary shocks to generate the observed patterns of
international quantity correlations. As is evident from the tables, with more than one stage of
processing, the home monetary expansion tends to generate smaller rises in the home prices and
larger falls in the foreign prices, and thus more aligned movements in both the home country's
and the foreign country's real aggregate demands (Tables 5 and 6), real money balances and
real purchasing powers (Table 7), and smaller terms-of-trade e®ect that would otherwise bene¯t
home households and ¯rms at the cost of their foreign counterparts (Table 8).6 These all help
6The foreign terms of trade of stage-n goods are de¯ned as the price of its exported goods (adjusted for
currency units) relative to the price of its imported goods at that stage. In a standard two-country sticky price
model with buyers' local currency pricing [e.g., Betts and Devereux (2000) and Chari, et al. (2002)], as in the
case of our model with a single processing stage, a home monetary expansion worsens the foreign terms of trade
on impact and has no further e®ect on terms of trade in the subsequent periods (see the bottom row in Table 8).
Thus, even though the demand for foreign's exported goods is boosted by the rise in real aggregate demand in
the home country (see the bottom row in Table 5), and thus the foreign households have to work harder and
invest more to meet the increased demand for foreign goods, the resulting increase in foreign's factor incomes is
o®set by its worsened terms of trade, leaving unchanged its real aggregate demand or real purchasing power (see
the bottom rows in Tables 6 and 7, respectively). This is why the degenerate version of our model with a single
stage of processing fails to generate cross-country quantity correlations. With multiple stages of processing, not
only are the foreign's terms of trade less worsened at more advanced stages on impact, but they are actually
reversed in sign in subsequent periods, with the improvements being more signi¯cant on a period-by-period
basis and over longer periods of time (see the second to the fourth rows in Table 8). Consistently, real aggregate
demand and real purchasing power in the foreign country increase and become more aligned with those in the
13increase the cross-country quantity correlations. Furthermore, the dampened rises in material
costs facing home ¯rms in the face of the full rises in home factor prices, and the magni¯ed falls
in material costs facing foreign ¯rms in the face of the untacked foreign factor prices, create
incentives for ¯rms to substitute intermediate inputs for primary factors | such incentives
become stronger at a more advanced processing stage. This tends to restrain the cross-country
correlation in hours worked from rising too much. Thus, and as we will show below through
numerical simulations, if consumption and leisure are nonseparable in households' preferences,
then our model with multiple stages of processing not only helps increase the cross-country
quantity correlations, but it also helps increase the output correlation more than it helps
increase the consumption correlation.
Formal analytical results are provided and further intuitions are discussed at length in the
Appendix to illuminate in more detail the shock propagation mechanism embodied in multiple
stages of processing. We now turn to showing, through simulations, that our model may indeed
help resolve the international quantity anomaly present in most international business cycle
models.
4 Resolving the International Quantity Anomaly: Simulations
A central challenge to models of international business cycles is that most theories predict
cross-country correlations in consumption that are larger than those in output, while the op-
posite pattern holds in the data. Further, standard monetary business cycle models with local
currency pricing and sticky prices typically predict cross-country correlations in consumption
and in output close to zero and usually in the wrong order as well. In the previous section,
we provided some intuitions as to why our model with multiple stages of processing may
potentially raise cross-country quantity correlations and meanwhile create a wedge between
the consumption correlation and the output correlation. In this section, we demonstrate this
potential of our model through numerical simulations.
home country (see the second to the fourth rows in Tables 5 to 7, respectively). This is why our model with
multiple stages of processing may potentially help generate signi¯cant cross-country quantity correlations.
144.1 Calibration
We start with calibrating the model's parameter values. We assume that households' period
utility function takes the following form:
U(C;M= ¹ PN;L) =
(·







=(1 ¡ ¾): (18)
The parameters to be calibrated include the subjective discount factor ¯, the preference
parameters b, º, », and ¾, the technology parameters ®, °, and µ, the capital depreciation
rate ±, the adjustment cost parameter Ã, the number of processing stages N, the share of
material input at each stage Á, and the monetary policy parameters ½¹ and ¾¹. The calibrated
parameter values are summarized in Table 9.
Since we set the length of each price contract equal to two model periods, and a typical
contract in actual economies lasts for one year (as suggested by Taylor's (1999) survey), a
period in the model corresponds to one-half of a year in the data. With this in mind, we
set ¯ = 0:961=2, so that the steady-state annualized real interest rate is equal to 4 percent,
as suggested by the standard business cycle literature. The parameter » is chosen so that,
in the steady state, a household devotes 1=4 of its time endowment to market activity. The
parameter ¾ corresponds to the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), and
we set ¾ = 3 so that the IES is about 1=3, which lies in the range of IES estimates obtained
by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) for stock holders. To assign values for b and º, we use the money


























¢¡1 is the gross nominal interest rate. The regression of this
equation using the U.S. data, as performed in Chari, et al. (2000), suggests that º = ¡1:56
and b = 0:94.
We next set ® = 1=3 and ± = 0:04 so that the baseline model predicts an annualized capital-
output ratio of 2:6 and an investment-output ratio of 0:21. We vary the capital adjustment
cost parameter Ã when computing the equilibrium dynamics for di®erent values of N, so that
the standard deviation of investment is three times as large as that of real GDP. In a balanced-
trade steady state, ° = YH=Y corresponds to the share of domestically produced goods in
real GDP. We set ° = 0:9, so that the import share in GDP is 10 percent. The parameter
µ determines the steady-state markup by ¯rms at each processing stage. Based on the work
15of Basu (1996), Basu and Fernald (1997, 2000), and Chari, et al. (2000), we set µ = 13,
corresponding to a markup of ¹ = 1:08.
A simple autoregression using quarterly M1 data in the postwar U.S. economy results
in an AR(1) coe±cient of 0:68 in the money growth process. Since a period in the model
corresponds to two quarters, we set ½¹ = 0:682. From the same regression, we obtain the
standard deviation of "t equal to ¾¹ = 0:0092. We impose no cross-correlation between the
two countries' money growth shocks, for two reasons. First, the data in the U.S. and Europe do
not support systematic correlations in the money growth rates; second, we would like to see how
much of the observed cross-country quantity correlations can be accounted for endogenously
by the structure of multiple processing stages (see also Footnote 8).
The remaining parameters are Á and N, which jointly determine the contribution of inter-
mediate goods in production. According to the BEA's 1997 Benchmark Input-Output Tables,
the share of intermediate goods in total manufacturing output is about 0:7. Let ´ denote the
steady-state share of total intermediate inputs (across all stages of processing) in gross sales.












Clearly, in addition to the condition that ´ = 0:7, we need a second condition to jointly
identify Á and N. For this purpose, we rely on the empirical evidence produced by Barsky, et
al. (2001), which suggests that a lower bound for the gross markup across di®erent stages of
production and distribution in the U.S. is at least 1:4. In the model, the gross markup across
all processing stages is given by ¹N. Given our calibrated value of the markup ¹ = 1:08 at
each stage and that ¹N = 1:4, the implied value of N is about 4. We thus view N = 4 as a
reasonable estimate for the OECD countries. The relation in (19) then implies a value for Á of
about 0:9. Since the OECD countries in general tend to produce a broad range of commodities,
from the most simple to the most sophisticated goods, while the emerging market economies
tend to produce mostly simple goods, we view N = 2 as a reasonable estimate for the Latin
American economies (see also Footnote 4).
4.2 Simulations
We examine now the model's quantitative implications for the cross-country correlations in
real GDP and in consumption. Real GDP in a country corresponds to the real value added
across all stages of processing in that country, which is summarized by the country's wage
16income, capital rental income, and pro¯t income. Inspecting the budget constraints facing the
home country's households reveals that the country's nominal income from these three sources
can be de°ated consistently by its consumer price index level ¹ PN(st). Thus, real GDP in the
home country is given by
XN(st) = [W(st)L(st) + R(st)K(st¡1) + ¦(st)]= ¹ PN(st): (20)
The foreign country's real GDP can be obtained similarly.
To conduct numerical simulations, we ¯rst log-linearize the model's equilibrium conditions
and solve this linearized system using standard numerical techniques. We then compute the
cross-country correlations in real GDP and in consumption from the simulated data. The detail
of the computation procedure is omitted here but available upon request from the authors.
Table 10 presents the simulation results under the calibrated parameter values. To put
the results into perspective, we also display the average correlation statistics for the OECD
countries as well as for the Latin American countries, which are computed from Tables 1 and 2.
The table shows that, with a single stage of processing, as in the standard monetary
business cycle models, monetary shocks cannot explain the observed cross-country quantity
correlations. In particular, both the output correlation and the consumption correlation are
close to zero, with the latter being slightly larger. Compared to the correlation patterns in the
data, this degenerate case of our model with N = 1 predicts quantity correlations that are not
only too small but also in the wrong order for consumption and for output.7
The baseline model with multiple stages of processing is much more promising in generating
the observed patterns in cross-country quantity correlations. For N larger than 1, not only
do the correlation statistics become larger, but the order between the consumption correlation
and the output correlation also comes more into line with what is observed in the actual data.
When N equals 2, the output correlation rises to 21 percent, and the consumption correlation
also rises, but to a lesser extent, to 16 percent. As N rises further to 3, and then to 4, the output
correlation rises to 36 percent, and then to 46 percent, while the consumption correlation rises
rises at a slower pace, ¯rst to 23 percent, and then to 30 percent.
7We also ¯nd that, if we assume that the cross-country correlations in the monetary shocks themselves are
large enough, as in Chari, et al. (2002), then the cross-country consumption correlation and output correlation
can become proportionally large (not reported). But we choose not to adopt this assumption because it does
not seem to be supported by empirical evidence, nor does it help to get the two quantity correlations into the
right order.
17These results con¯rm the intuitions provided in Section 3. To reiterate our main ¯ndings:
the baseline model with multiple stages of processing not only helps increase cross-country
quantity correlations, it helps more in increasing output correlation than consumption correla-
tion, thus putting the two quantity correlations into the right order. Comparing the correlation
statistics generated from the model to those in the actual data reveals that the model's pre-
dicted correlations with N = 2 are broadly consistent with the correlations observed between
the Latin American economies, and with N = 4 are close to those observed between the OECD
countries. In both cases, the model is able to generate the correct order between the output
correlation and the consumption correlation. As we have argued in the Calibration section,
N = 4 seems to be an empirically plausible estimation for the OECD countries, and N = 2
for the Latin American economies. In this sense, one may interpret our results as providing a
possible explanation for why the quantity correlations between the OECD countries are typi-
cally higher than those between the emerging market economies, and why, in both regions, the
output correlations are systematically larger than the consumption correlations.
5 Concluding Remarks
A central challenge to international business cycle theory is to explain the observed patterns
in international quantity correlations. In this paper, we have proposed a mechanism that may
help meet this challenge. The novelty of our model with multiple stages of processing is that
it propagates a monetary expansion in the home country to lower the foreign price level while
containing a smaller rise in the home price level. It does so through reducing material costs
and thus marginal costs in terms of the foreign currency unit while dampening the upward
movements in the costs in terms of the home currency unit. In consequence, it tends to amplify
and align the movements in the countries' real aggregate demands and real purchasing powers
and to dampen the e®ects of the adjustment in the terms of trade, which would otherwise
bene¯t home households and ¯rms at the cost of their foreign counterparts. These all help
increase the international quantity correlations. Further, through lowering the relative costs
of materials to primary factors, it creates an incentive for ¯rms to substitute intermediate
inputs for primary factors. This incentive of factor substitution, which is stronger at a more
advanced processing stage, tends to put a constraint on the rise of the cross-country correlation
in hours worked and, with nonseparable preferences in consumption and leisure, on the rise in
consumption correlation as well. In consequence, the mechanism embodied in the model with
18multiple stages of processing and trade helps increase the international quantity correlations,
and it helps increase the output correlation more than it helps increase the consumption
correlation, putting the two correlations into the right order.
Throughout our analysis, we have assumed that monetary shocks are the only driving force
of international business cycle dynamics, and we abstract from other potentially important
sources of shocks. To generate a correct order between the cross-country correlations in out-
put and in consumption, our model relies on the factor substitution e®ect that tends to keep
the cross-country correlation in hours worked from rising. Since the international correlation
in employment is typically positive and signi¯cant [e.g., Backus, et al. (1992, 1995) and Bax-
ter (1995)], there is a tension between matching the employment correlation and matching
the consumption correlation. This tension can potentially be relieved by introducing other
aggregate demand shocks, such as government spending shocks: an expansion in home gov-
ernment spending tends to reduce home consumption and increase home employment through
the standard wealth e®ect, while boosting foreign's consumption and employment through the
stimulating e®ect on real aggregate demand and real purchasing power identi¯ed in the current
paper.
The general framework outlined in this paper can be used to study other important issues.
For example, with typical goods going through multiple stages of processing and crossing bor-
ders multiple times, a small transportation cost at each stage will generate large impediments
to moving the goods across countries. Therefore, while a single-stage model with transporta-
tion cost may not be very successful in explaining the puzzle of home-bias in consumption and
production [see, for example, the exchange between Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) and Engles
(2000)], a model with multiple stages of processing seems to be more promising. This idea is in
the same spirit of Yi (2003), who shows how small tari® cuts in recent decades can serve as an
important source of the large and non-linear rise in world trade (in particular, vertical trade).
The model presented here can also be used to address the exchange rate persistence and inter-
national welfare issues following a country's unilateral monetary expansion [e.g., Huang and
Liu (2003)]. In our view, future research along these dimensions can be fruitful. The current
paper represents only a small step in this direction.
196 Appendix
In this appendix, we formally demonstrate the mechanism through which multiple stages of
processing help propagate monetary shocks to generate international quantity correlations. To
help obtain analytical results, we focus here on the case with no capital accumulation. For the
same purpose, we assume that the period utility function of the representative household in
each country is separable in consumption, real money balances, and labor hours. In particular,
the period-utility function of a home household takes the following form:
U(C;M= ¹ PN;L) = log(C) + ©log(M= ¹ PN) ¡ ªL; (21)
for © > 0 and ª > 0, and that of the foreign household takes a similar form. As shown by
Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), the linearity of the period-utility function in labor hours
is a consequence of aggregation when labor is assumed to be indivisible and such a utility
function is consistent with any labor supply elasticity at the individual level.
6.1 Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
To solve for equilibrium dynamics, we ¯rst reduce the equilibrium conditions to 10N + 4
equations. These include 2N pairs of pricing decision equations, one for each ¯rm in a given
country on a given stage of processing (i.e., there are 4N pricing decision equations). In each
pair, one component corresponds to the price set by the ¯rm for the domestic market while
the other corresponds to that for the foreign market. There are correspondingly 2N pairs of
price indices. In addition, there are 2N price indices in the two countries for the N processing
stages, each being an average of the price indices of domestic goods and imported goods at a
given stage. Finally, there is a labor supply equation and a money demand equation of each
country's representative household. We log-linearize these equations around a deterministic
steady state and use lowercase letters to denote the log-deviations of the corresponding level
variables (in uppercase letters) from their steady-state values.
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n(t + 1) + e(t + 1)]; (25)
20where Et is a conditional expectation operator, n 2 f1;:::;Ng, vn = Á¹ pn¡1 + (1 ¡ Á)w
and v¤
n = Á¹ p¤
n¡1 + (1 ¡ Á)w¤ are the linearized stage-n marginal costs in domestic currency
units facing home ¯rms and foreign ¯rms, respectively, with ¹ p0(t) ´ w(t) and ¹ p¤
0(t) ´ w¤(t).
Equation (22) says that the optimal price a stage-n ¯rm in the home country would set for
the home market is an average of its marginal costs in the current and the next period. If
n ¸ 2, the marginal cost is a weighted average of the price index of stage n ¡ 1 goods and
the nominal wage rate, since both of these goods and labor are used as inputs for producing
the ¯rm's output; if n = 1, the marginal cost is simply the nominal wage rate, since labor is
the only input used by the ¯rm. Similarly, from equation (23), we see that the optimal price
set by a home ¯rm for the foreign market is a weighted average of the exchange-rate-adjusted
marginal costs facing the ¯rm within its price contract duration. The optimal pricing rules
(24)-(25) of the foreign ¯rms are similarly interpreted.
The (2N pairs of) price indices of goods produced in the two countries and sold in the two
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nH(t ¡ 1)]: (27)
Under staggered price contracts, each price index records both the prices set in the current
period and those set in the previous period. The price index of stage n in each country is
an average of the price index of domestically produced goods and the price index of imported
goods. There are 2N of these price indices and they are given by
¹ pn(t) = °¹ pnH(t) + (1 ¡ °)¹ pnF(t); ¹ p¤
n(t) = °¹ p¤
nF(t) + (1 ¡ °)¹ p¤
nH(t): (28)
Note that the parameter ° corresponds to the steady state share of domestically produced
goods in total GDP, and it measures the steady-state home-bias.8
The households' labor supply decisions are described by
w(t) = ¹ pN(t) + yN(t); w¤(t) = ¹ p¤
N(t) + y¤
N(t): (29)
8From equations (4) and (5), the steady-state ratio of home-produced goods to imported goods is given by
°=(1 ¡ °). Further, in light of (13) and (14), this is true for all processing stages.
21Thus, real wage in each country is proportional to real consumption in that country (since the
¯nal good market clearing condition implies that yN(t) = c(t) and y¤
N(t) = c¤(t)).9
The money demand equations are given by
¹ pN(t) + yN(t) = (1 ¡ ¯)m(t) + ¯Et[¹ pN(t + 1) + yN(t + 1)]; (30)
¹ p¤
N(t) + y¤
N(t) = (1 ¡ ¯)m¤(t) + ¯Et[¹ p¤
N(t + 1) + y¤
N(t + 1)]; (31)
where an intertemporal term enters each country's money demand equation because money
demand is interest-rate sensitive.
The equilibrium dynamics for this simpli¯ed model are described by (22)-(31).
6.2 Analytical Results and Further Intuitions
To gain insights into the monetary transmission mechanism embedded in multiple stages of pro-
cessing, it is useful to examine the e®ects on each country's variables of a unilateral monetary
expansion in, say, the home country. For this purpose, we assume that money supply in each
country follows a random walk process, i.e., m(t) = m(t¡1)+²(t), and m¤(t) = m¤(t¡1)+²¤(t),
where the money growth rates ²(t) and ²¤(t) are uncorrelated white noise process, and that
there is a one-time shock to the money growth rate in the home country in period 0 and
no shocks to the foreign money growth rate. In other words, we consider the case in which
²(0) = 1, ²(t) = 0 for all t ¸ 1, and ²¤(t) = 0 for all t ¸ 0. The implied money supply processes
are then m(t) = 1 and m¤(t) = 0 for all t ¸ 0. We focus on a perfect foresight equilibrium and
compute the impulse responses of each country's variables.
Before stating our ¯rst proposition, we need to introduce a notation for terms of trade. The
foreign terms of trade of stage-n goods are de¯ned as the price of its exported goods (adjusted
for currency units) relative to the price of its imported goods at that stage, which is given by
¿¤
n(t) = ¹ pnF(t) ¡ e(t) ¡ ¹ p¤
nH(t); 1 · n · N: (32)
The following proposition partially characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There is a unique perfect foresight equilibrium in which
w(t) = 1; w¤(t) = 0; 8t ¸ 0; (33)
e(t) = 1; 8t ¸ 0; (34)
9Note that in this open-economy setup without capital or government spending, the current account balance
accounts for the di®erence between GDP (aggregate output) and consumption (aggregate demand) in each
country.
22pnH(t) = 1; pnF(t) = 1; 8t ¸ n ¡ 1; 1 · n · N; (35)
p¤
nF(t) = 0; p¤
nH(t) = 0; 8t ¸ n ¡ 1; 1 · n · N; (36)
¹ pn(t) = 1; ¹ p¤
n(t) = 0; 8t ¸ n; 1 · n · N; (37)
yN(t) = 0; y¤
N(t) = 0; 8t ¸ N; (38)
¿¤
n(t) = 0; 8t ¸ n; 1 · n · N: (39)
for all N ¸ 1.
Proof: Using the money demand equations (30) and (31), the pricing decision equations
(22)-(25), the equations de¯ning price indices (26)-(28), and proper transversality conditions
for home and foreign households' optimization problems, we can show that there is a unique
non-explosive perfect foresight equilibrium that satis¯es
¹ pN(t) + yN(t) = m(t) = 1; ¹ p¤
N(t) + y¤
N(t) = m¤(t) = 0; (40)
which, along with the labor supply equations (29), leads to (33). The ¯rst order conditions for
the households' optimization problems also imply that the nominal exchange rate is given by
e(t) = [u¤
c(t) ¡ ¹ p¤
N(t)] ¡ [uc(t) ¡ ¹ pN(t)] = [¹ pN(t) + yN(t)] ¡ [¹ p¤
N(t) + y¤
N(t)] = 1, which proves
(34). Given (33) and (34), we can prove (35)-(37) by induction and then use (40) to obtain
(38). Finally, using (34)-(36), we can establish (39). Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 shows that the shock to money supply in the home country drives up the
domestic nominal wage rate immediately but has no e®ect on the foreign nominal wage rate.
The shock leads to a complete home nominal exchange rate depreciation. After n periods
following the shock, the price index of stage-n goods in the home country rises fully while
the price index of stage-n goods in the foreign country returns to the steady state. As a
consequence, the stage-n terms of trade return to the steady state n periods following the
shock. Finally, after N periods following the shock, the real aggregate demand in each country
also returns to the steady state.
The proposition therefore shows, among other things, that the monetary shock a®ects
neither country's terms of trade or real aggregate demand in the long run. It turns out that
cross-country quantity correlations in our model are largely determined by the short-run e®ects
on each country's real aggregate demand and terms of trade. How large these e®ects can be
and how long they can last depend on how many processing stages there are. Before proceeding
further, it is useful to examine a degenerate version of our model with a single processing stage
and to illustrate why it fails to serve as an international monetary transmission mechanism.
23In the case with N = 1, all production and trade occur at a single stage, and ¯rms' marginal
cost is simply given by the domestic wage rate. Note that the home nominal wage rate rises
fully in all periods following the shock (i.e., (33)). Thus, ¯rms in the home country that can
set new prices will respond by fully increasing their prices for the home market (i.e., (35)). On
the other hand, although the foreign nominal wage rate in terms of the foreign currency unit
is una®ected by the shock (i.e., (33)), it rises fully in terms of the home currency unit due to
home currency depreciation (i.e., (34)). Thus, ¯rms in the foreign country that can set new
prices will fully raise their prices for the home market (i.e., (35)) as well. In consequence, the
price level in the home country, which is a weighted average of the price index of domestic
goods and the price index of imported goods, will rise fully as soon as all ¯rms have had the
chance to adjust their prices (i.e., (37)). It then follows from (40) that home's real aggregate
demand rises only in the impact period when the shock occurs, and it goes back to the steady
state upon the expiration of the initial price contracts (i.e., (38)).
In the foreign country, since nominal wage rate is una®ected by the shock, ¯rms will choose
not to adjust their prices set for the domestic market even if they can do so. On the other hand,
since the rise in the home nominal wage rate is exactly o®set by the home currency devaluation,
the home nominal wage rate in terms of the foreign currency unit remains unchanged and thus
¯rms in the home country will also choose not to adjust their prices set for the foreign market
even if they can choose new prices. Thus, in all periods following the shock, the foreign price
level remains unchanged and, in light of (40), so does its real aggregate demand. That is, we
have both ¹ p¤
N(t) = 0 and y¤
N(t) = 0 for all t ¸ 0 if N = 1. This in particular implies that
the home monetary expansion does not a®ect real aggregate demand in the foreign country
in the case with a single processing stage. This is so since, even though the demand for
foreign's exported goods increases and thus the foreign household has to work harder to meet
the demand, the increase in the foreign household's income is o®set by its worsened terms of
trade (see (39) and Proposition 2 below), leaving unchanged the real aggregate demand in the
foreign country. This is why the degenerate version of our model with N = 1 fails to generate
cross-country quantity correlations.
We now show that our model with multiple stages of processing implies a dampened terms-
of-trade e®ect and an enhanced e®ect on real aggregate demand of the shock, both of which are
important for generating cross-country quantity correlations. We establish ¯rst a key result
regarding the patterns of short-run price adjustments across di®erent processing stages in the
two countries.
24Theorem 1. Suppose that N ¸ 2. In the perfect foresight equilibrium, the following
inequalities hold for all n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g:
0 < pn+1;H(t) < pnH(t); 0 < pn+1;F(t) · pnF(t); 0 · t · n ¡ 1; (41)
p¤
n+1;F(t) · p¤
nF(t) · 0; p¤
n+1;H(t) < p¤
nH(t) · 0; 0 · t · n ¡ 1; (42)
0 < ¹ pn+1(t) < ¹ pn(t); ¹ p¤
n+1(t) < ¹ p¤
n(t) · 0; 0 · t · n: (43)
Proof: Given the solution for the nominal exchange rate e(t) = 1 as in (34), the pricing
decision equations (22)-(25) imply that
p¤
nH(t) = pnH(t) ¡ 1; p¤
nF(t) = pnF(t) ¡ 1: (44)
Thus, (42) will be an immediate corollary if we can establish (41).
To prove (41), we ¯rst use (22) and (25), along with the de¯nitions of the marginal cost
terms vn = Á¹ pn¡1 + 1 ¡ Á and v¤
n = Á¹ p¤
n¡1 (where we have used the conditions w(t) = 1 and
w¤(t) = 0 based on (33)) and the relations between home prices and foreign prices described
in (44) to obtain the following recursive relations:
pn+2;H(t) = 1 ¡ Á +
Á
2
f°[pn+1;H(t) + apn+1;H(t ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ a)pn+1;H(t + 1)]
+(1 ¡ °)[pn+1;F(t) + apn+1;F(t ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ a)pn+1;F(t + 1)]g; (45)
pn+2;F(t) = 1 ¡ Á° +
Á
2
f°[pn+1;F(t) + apn+1;F(t ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ a)pn+1;F(t + 1)]
+(1 ¡ °)[pn+1;H(t) + apn+1;H(t ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ a)pn+1;H(t + 1)]g; (46)
where a ´ 1=(1 + ¯). We then prove (41) by induction. It's straightforward to verify that the
inequalities in (41) hold for n = 1. This establishes the result for N = 2. Suppose N > 2 and
assume (41) holds for n 2 f1;:::;N ¡2g. Fix an arbitrary t with 0 · t · n. By the induction
hypothesis and (35), we have
pn+1;H(t ¡ 1) · pnH(t ¡ 1); pn+1;H(t) · pnH(t); pn+1;H(t + 1) · pnH(t + 1);
with at least one strict inequality, and
pn+1;F(t ¡ 1) · pnF(t ¡ 1); pn+1;F(t) · pnF(t); pn+1;F(t + 1) · pnF(t + 1);
with at least one strict inequality if and only if n > 1. It follows from (45) and (46) that
pn+2;H(t) < pn+1;H(t) and pn+2;F(t) · pn+1;F(t). This completes the proof of (41). Equation
(44) then implies that the inequalities in (42) also hold. Finally, the inequalities in (43) follow
from the de¯nitions of the price indices speci¯ed in (12) and (41)-(42). Q.E.D.
25According to Theorem 1, individual prices (for both domestic goods and imported goods)
and price indices rise in the home country and fall in the foreign country in the short run at all
processing stages. The rises are smaller and the falls are greater, while both are spread over
longer periods of time, at more advanced processing stages.
Theorem 1 lays out a foundation for establishing our next two results concerning the short-
run e®ects on real aggregate demand and terms of trade of the shock. It is therefore worth
spending some e®ort to understand the intuition behind this theorem.
The key to understanding the patterns of price adjustments prescribed in Theorem 1 is to
understand the patterns of marginal cost dynamics across di®erent processing stages. First,
consider stage 1. The marginal cost facing home ¯rms is the home nominal wage rate, which
rises fully in terms of the home currency unit, but stays unchanged in terms of the foreign
currency unit due to the foreign currency appreciation. Thus, these ¯rms, whenever they can
set new prices, would fully raise their prices p1H(t) for the home market, but keep unchanged
their prices p¤
1H(t) for the foreign market. The marginal cost facing foreign ¯rms is the foreign
nominal wage rate, which, although unchanged in terms of the foreign currency unit, rises fully
in terms of the home currency unit due to the home currency devaluation. Thus, these ¯rms,
whenever they can set new prices, would fully increase their prices p1F(t) for the home market,
but keep unchanged their prices p¤
1F(t) for the foreign market. Combining these individual
pricing decisions implies that, in the home market, both the price index of home goods ¹ p1H(t)
and the price index of foreign goods ¹ p1F(t) rise fully for t ¸ 1, but only partially at t = 0
due to staggered price contracts; however, in the foreign market, both the price index of home
goods ¹ p¤
1H(t) and the price index of foreign goods ¹ p¤
1F(t) stay unchanged for all t ¸ 0.
Next, consider stage 2. The marginal cost facing home ¯rms records not only the home
nominal wage rate, but also the stage-1 home market price index ¹ p1(t), which is an average of
¹ p1H(t) and ¹ p1F(t), and thus rises partially in terms of the home currency unit and falls partially
in terms of the foreign currency unit at t = 0 due to the foreign currency appreciation. Thus,
these ¯rms, if they can set new prices at t = 0, would only partially raise their prices p2H(0) for
the home market and partially lower their prices p¤
2H(0) for the foreign market. The marginal
cost facing foreign ¯rms records both the foreign nominal wage rate and the stage-1 foreign
market price index ¹ p¤
1(t), which is an average of ¹ p¤
1H(t) and ¹ p¤
1F(t), and thus stays unchanged
in terms of the foreign currency unit but rises fully in terms of the home currency unit due to
the home currency devaluation. Thus, these ¯rms, whenever they can set new prices, would
fully raise their prices p2F(t) for the home market but keep unchanged their prices p¤
2F(t) for
26the foreign market. Combining these individual pricing decisions implies that, in the home
market, the price index of home goods ¹ p2H(t) not only rises less than does ¹ p1H(t) at t = 0,
but also rises only partially at t = 1 due to staggered price contracts (as opposed to the latter,
which rises fully at t = 1); however, in the foreign market, the price index of home goods
¹ p¤
2H(t) declines partially at t = 0 and 1 due to staggered price contracts. The behaviors of
¹ p2F(t) and ¹ p¤
2F(t), on the other hand, are similar to those of ¹ p1F(t) and ¹ p¤
1F(t), respectively.
Now, consider stage 3. The marginal cost facing home ¯rms records both the home nominal
wage rate and the stage-2 home market price index ¹ p2(t), which is an average of ¹ p2H(t) and
¹ p2F(t), and thus not only rises less than does ¹ p1(t) in terms of the home currency unit and falls
more than does ¹ p1(t) in terms of the foreign currency unit at t = 0, but also rises only partially
in terms of the home currency unit and falls partially in terms of the foreign currency unit
at t = 1. Thus, these ¯rms, when they can set new prices, would raise their prices p3H(t) for
the home market by less than the rise in p2H(t), and lower their prices p¤
3H(t) for the foreign
market by more than the cut in p¤
2H(t) for t = 0 and 1. The marginal cost facing foreign
¯rms records both the foreign nominal wage rate and the stage-2 foreign market price index
¹ p¤
2(t), which is an average of ¹ p¤
2H(t) and ¹ p¤
2F(t), and thus falls partially in terms of the foreign
currency unit and rises only partially in terms of the home currency unit at t = 0 and 1. Thus,
these ¯rms, when they can set new prices, would only raise their prices p3F(t) partially for
the home market, and lower their prices p¤
3F(t) partially for the foreign market for t = 0 and
1. Combining these individual pricing decisions implies that, in the home market, the price
index of home goods ¹ p3H(t) not only rises less than does ¹ p2H(t) at t = 0;1, but also rises only
partially at t = 2, and the price index of foreign goods ¹ p3F(t) rises only partially for t = 0;1,
and 2; however, in the foreign market, the price index of home goods ¹ p¤
3H(t) not only declines
more than does ¹ p¤
2H(t) at t = 0;1, but also declines partially at t = 2, and the price index of
foreign goods ¹ p¤
3F(t) declines partially for t = 0;1, and 2. It follows that the rise in the home
market price index ¹ p3(t) is smaller than the rise in ¹ p2(t) for all t · 1 while ¹ p3(t) does not rise
fully until t = 3 (as opposed to ¹ p2(t), which rises fully at t = 2), and the fall in the foreign
market price index ¹ p¤
3(t) is greater than the fall in ¹ p¤
2(t) for all t · 1, while ¹ p¤
3(t) does not
return to 0 until t = 3 (as opposed to ¹ p¤
2(t), which returns to 0 at t = 2).
Continuing this argument shows that, from early to later processing stages, the marginal
costs facing home and foreign ¯rms rise less and less in terms of the home currency unit and
fall more and more in terms of the foreign currency unit, while the movements of the marginal
costs are spread over a longer and longer period of time. Thus, this cross-country input-output
27structure serves both to dampen the upward movements of the marginal costs in the home
currency unit and to magnify the downward movements of the marginal costs in the foreign
currency unit. As a consequence, the rises in the home market prices are attenuated and the
falls in the foreign market prices are magni¯ed on a period-by-period basis and are spread over
a longer and longer period of time along the processing stages, as Theorem 1 prescribes.
These patterns of short-run price dynamics propagated by multiple stages of processing
have important implications for short-run dynamics in real aggregate demand and terms of
trade. First, they imply a positive e®ect on real aggregate demand in the foreign country
of the home monetary expansion. Moreover, the increases in real aggregate demand in the
two countries tend to reinforce each other so that they both become greater. The following
proposition follows directly from (40) and (43).
Proposition 2. In the perfect foresight equilibrium, the following inequalities hold for all
N ¸ 1:
yN+1(t) > yN(t) > 0; y¤
N+1(t) > y¤
N(t) ¸ 0; 0 · t · N: (47)
One implication of (47) is that real aggregate demand increases not only in the home
country but also in the foreign country, even if there are only two stages of processing. In
contrast, in the degenerate case with a single processing stage, real aggregate demand in the
home country rises but that in the foreign country remains unchanged. A further implication
of (47) is that, with more processing stages, real aggregate demands in the two countries tend
to reinforce each other so that they both become larger. We show now that such cross-country
input-output connections tend to alleviate the negative e®ect on the terms of trade facing
foreign households and ¯rms. In particular, not only are the foreign's terms of trade in the
impact period of the shock less worsened at more advanced processing stages, but they are
actually reversed in subsequent periods, with the improvement being more signi¯cant on a
period-by-period basis and over a longer period of time at more advanced stages.




n¡1(t); for 0 · t · n ¡ 1; 2 · n · N; (48)
¿¤
n(0) < 0; for 1 · n · N; (49)
¿¤
n(t) > 0; for 1 · t · n ¡ 1; 2 · n · N: (50)
Proof: Since the foreign's terms of trade involve only ¹ pnF and ¹ p¤
nH, to prove (48), we ¯rst
use the relation (44) and the de¯nitions of price indices (26) - (28) to express the price indices
28of stage-n goods in terms of ¹ pnF and ¹ p¤






nH(0) + (1 ¡ °)¹ pnF(0) +
°
2 if t = 0
°¹ p¤







°¹ pnF(0) + (1 ¡ °)¹ p¤
nH(0) ¡
°
2 if t = 0
°¹ pnF(t) + (1 ¡ °)¹ p¤
nH(t) ¡ ° if t ¸ 1:
(52)
We next use the pricing decision equations (25) and (23), along with the results established
in Proposition 1, to obtain
pnF(t) = aÁ¹ p¤
n¡1(t) + (1 ¡ a)Á¹ p¤
n¡1(t + 1) + 1; (53)
p¤
nH(t) = aÁ¹ pn¡1(t) + (1 ¡ a)Á¹ pn¡1(t + 1) ¡ Á;: (54)
Then, by combining (51) - (54) and using the de¯nition of the terms of trade (32), we
obtain a recursive relation for ¿¤
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n¡1(t + 1)]; if t ¸ 2:
(55)











4 , and ¿¤
2(t) = 0 for all t ¸ 2. Thus, (48) holds for
N = 2.




n(t); for 0 · t · n: (56)
To prove (56), we ¯rst extend the recursive relation in (55) to stage n + 1 and take the
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Thus, (56) holds for t = 0.




n(t + 1) > ¿¤
n(t + 1); ¿¤
n+1(t ¡ 1) > ¿¤
n(t ¡ 1): (58)
29Thus, (57) implies that (56) holds for 1 · t · n ¡ 2.
If t = n¡1, then from the induction hypothesis, ¿¤
n(s) > ¿¤
n¡1(s) for s = t; t¡1; and from
Theorem 1, ¿¤
n(t + 1) = ¿¤
n¡1(t + 1) = 0. Therefore, (56) holds for t = n ¡ 1.
Finally, if t = n, then ¿¤
n(t¡1) > ¿¤
n¡1(t¡1) by the induction hypothesis, and meanwhile,
(39) implies that ¿¤
n(s) = ¿¤
n¡1(s) = 0 for s = t;t + 1. Thus, (56) also holds for t = n.
To prove (49), we ¯rst note that ¹ p¤
nH(0) = ¹ pnH¡ 1
2 and thus ¿¤
n(0) = ¹ pnF(0)¡¹ pnH(0)¡ 1
2. It
is easy to verify that ¹ p1F = ¹ p1H = 1
2. These results, coupled with the monotone pattern of price
adjustments established in Theorem 1, imply that 0 < ¹ pnF · ¹ p1F = 1
2 and 0 < ¹ pnH · ¹ p1H = 1
2
for all n 2 f1;¢¢¢;Ng. It follows that ¿¤
n(0) < 0 for all n 2 f1;¢¢¢;Ng.
Given (48), to prove (50), it su±ces to show that ¿¤
n(n¡1) > 0 for all n 2 f2;¢¢¢;Ng. It is
straightforward to verify that ¿¤
2(1) =
aÁ
4 > 0 and thus (50) holds for n = 2. Suppose it holds
for an arbitrary n 2 f2;¢¢¢;N ¡ 1g. We need to show that ¿¤
n+1(n) > 0. This last inequality
holds, since (48) and (39) imply that ¿¤
n+1(n) > ¿¤
n(n) = 0. Q.E.D.
According to Proposition 3, although the foreign's terms of trade in the impact period of
the shock are worsened [e.g., (49)], they are less so at more advanced stages of processing [e.g.,
(48)]. Further, in light of (50) and (48), the foreign's terms of trade actually improve in the
subsequent periods, and the improvements are greater and over longer periods of time at more
advanced processing stages.
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34Table 1
International Quantity Correlations in OECD Countriesa
Correlation with US Correlation with the rest of OECDb
Corr(y;y¤) Corr(c;c¤) Corr(y;y¤) Corr(c;c¤)
Australia 0:72 0:08 0:50 ¡0:11
Canada 0:80 0:48 0:69 0:41
France 0:30 0:15 0:40 0:43
Italy 0:33 ¡0:15 0:41 0:03
Japan 0:21 0:24 0:22 0:36
Switzerland 0:38 0:30 0:41 0:38
UK 0:69 0:55 0:68 0:65
US 1:00 1:00 0:50 0:31
Averagec 0:60 0:38 0:47 0:31
aThe data are annual per capita real GDP and consumption from 1973 to 2000, taken from the World Development
Indicators.
bCorrelations in output and consumption between a particular country and an OECD aggregate constructed using
all other countries' data.
cThe ¯rst two entrants in this row are the correlations of output and consumption between the US and an EU
aggregate, taken from Chari, et al. (2002). The other two entrants are the averages of the correlation statistics in
the last two columns.
35Table 2











aThe data are annual per capita real GDP and consumption from 1973 to 2000, taken from the World Development
Indicators. The correlations are between a particular country and an aggregate of the rest of the Latin American
countries. We have also examined the pairwise correlations and obtained similar results.
36Table 3.
Price indices in the home country
¹ pn(t) t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
n = 4 0:3337 0:7941 0:9558 0:9953 1
n = 3 0:3532 0:8304 0:9772 1 1
n = 2 0:3987 0:8987 1 1 1
n = 1 0:5 1 1 1 1
Table 4.
Price indices in the foreign country
¹ p¤
n(t) t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
n = 4 ¡0:0276 ¡0:0379 ¡0:0118 ¡0:0015 0
n = 3 ¡0:0204 ¡0:0250 ¡0:0046 0 0
n = 2 ¡0:0113 ¡0:0113 0 0 0
n = 1 0 0 0 0 0
37Table 5.
Real aggregate demand in the home country
YN(t) t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
N = 4 0:6663 0:2059 0:0442 0:0047 0
N = 3 0:6468 0:1696 0:0228 0 0
N = 2 0:6013 0:1013 0 0 0
N = 1 0:5 0 0 0 0
Table 6.
Real aggregate demand in the foreign country
Y ¤
N(t) t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
N = 4 0:0276 0:0379 0:0118 0:0015 0
N = 3 0:0204 0:0250 0:0046 0 0
N = 2 0:0113 0:0113 0 0 0
N = 1 0 0 0 0 0
38Table 7.
Real balances in the foreign country
m¤(t) t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
N = 4 0:0276 0:0379 0:0118 0:0015 0
N = 3 0:0204 0:0250 0:0046 0 0
N = 2 0:0113 0:0113 0 0 0
N = 1 0 0 0 0 0
Table 8.
Foreign country's terms of trade
¿¤
n(t) t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
n = 4 ¡0:3265 0:21 0:0407 0:0041 0
n = 3 ¡0:3870 0:1128 0:0003 0 0
n = 2 ¡0:3875 0:1125 0 0 0
n = 1 ¡0:5 0 0 0 0
39Table 9
Calibrated parameters
Preferences: ¯ = 0:961=2, b = 0:94, º = ¡1:56, » = 1:6, ¾ = 3
Technologies: ® = 1=3, µ = 13, ° = 0:9, Á = 0:9
Capital accumulation: ± = 0:04, Ã adjusted
Money growth process: ½¹ = 0:682, ¾¹ = 0:0092
Table 10
International Correlations: Model versus Dataa
Corr(y;y¤) Corr(c;c¤)
OECD 0:47 0:31
Latin America 0:24 0:09
N = 1 ¡0:05 ¡0:03
N = 2 0:21 0:16
N = 3 0:36 0:23
N = 4 0:46 0:30
aThe model's correlation statistics are averages over 300 simulations of 90 periods each (the ¯rst and the last 20
observations in each simulated series are discarded to avoid dependence on initial and terminal conditions).
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